Judge Bias in Labor Courts and Firm Performance

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of the European Economic Association
Year: 2024
Volume: 22
Issue: 3
Pages: 1319-1366

Authors (4)

Pierre Cahuc (Sciences Po) Stéphane Carcillo (not in RePEc) Bérengère Patault (not in RePEc) Flavien Moreau (International Monetary Fund (I...)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper documents the existence of judge-specific differences on granting compensation for wrongful dismissal and shows that their consequences are different for small low-performing firms than for other firms. Pro-worker judge bias reduces job creation for all firms, increases the destruction of permanent jobs in small and low-performing firms but reduces it in large high-performing firms. Pro-worker bias reduces employment and survival for small and low-performing firms but has no significant effects on these outcomes for the other firms. The probability that permanent incumbent workers keep their job in firms judged by a pro-worker judge increases in large and high-performing firms, while it decreases in small, poorly performing firms.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:jeurec:v:22:y:2024:i:3:p:1319-1366.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25