Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 115
Issue: 2
Pages: 160-163

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper introduces a contract between the government and trade unions in a model of strategic wage bargaining à la Lippi (2003). It shows that an optimal contract can be implemented through an appropriately defined inflation target.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:2:p:160-163
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25