Liquidity Coinsurance and Bank Capital

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
Year: 2014
Volume: 46
Issue: 2-3
Pages: 409-443

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Banks can deal with their liquidity risk by holding liquid assets (self‐insurance), by participating in interbank markets (coinsurance), or by using flexible financing instruments, such as bank capital (risk sharing). We use a simple model to show that undiversifiable liquidity risk, that is, the liquidity risk that banks are unable to coinsure on interbank markets, represents an important risk factor affecting their capital structures. Banks facing higher undiversifiable liquidity risk hold more capital. We posit that, empirically, banks that are more exposed to undiversifiable liquidity risk are less active on interbank markets. Therefore, we test for the existence of a negative relationship between bank capital and interbank market activity and find support in a large sample of U.S. commercial banks.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:jmoncb:v:46:y:2014:i:2-3:p:409-443
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25