On the individual optimality of economic integration

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Monetary Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 68
Issue: C
Pages: 115-135

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Which countries find it optimal to form an economic union? We emphasize the risk-sharing benefits of economic integration. Consider an endowment world economy model, where international financial markets are incomplete and contracts not enforceable. A union solves both frictions among member countries. We uncover conditions on initial incomes and net foreign assets of potential union members such that forming a union is welfare-improving over standing alone in the world economy. Consistently with evidence on economic integration, unions in our model occur (i) relatively infrequently, and (ii) emerge more likely among homogeneous countries, and (iii) rich countries.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:moneco:v:68:y:2014:i:c:p:115-135
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25