The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements.

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 1991
Volume: 81
Issue: 3
Pages: 497-513

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Demandable-debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension, liquidation, and idle reserve holdings. An explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive-compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors. Demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation. Its usefulness in transacting follows from information-sharing between monitors and nonmonitors. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:81:y:1991:i:3:p:497-513
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25