The Political Economy Consequences of China’s Export Slowdown

Abstract

We study how adverse economic shocks influence political outcomes in strong authoritarian regimes, by examining the export slowdown in China during the mid-2010s. We first show that prefectures that experienced a more severe export slowdown witnessed a significant increase in incidents of labor strikes, using a shift-share instrumental variables strategy. The prefecture party secretary was subsequently more likely to be replaced by the central government, particularly if the rise in strikes was greater than in other prefectures that saw comparable export slowdowns. These patterns are consistent with a simple framework we develop, where the central government makes strategic use of a turnover decision to induce effort from local officials in preserving social stability, and to screen them for retention. In line with the framework’s predictions, we find a heightened emphasis by local party secretaries—particularly younger officials whose career concerns are stronger—on upholding stability following negative export shocks. This is evident in both words (from textual analysis of official speeches) and deeds (from expenditures on public security and social spending).