A Model of Fickle Capital Flows and Retrenchment

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2020
Volume: 128
Issue: 6
Pages: 2288 - 2328

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We develop a model of gross capital flows and analyze their role in global financial stability. In our model, consistent with the data, when a country experiences asset fire sales, foreign investments exit (fickleness), while domestic investments abroad return home (retrenchment). When countries have symmetric expected returns and financial development, the benefits of retrenchment dominate the costs of fickleness and gross flows increase fire-sale prices. Fickleness, however, creates a coordination problem since it encourages local policy makers to restrict capital inflows. When countries are asymmetric, capital flows are driven by additional mechanisms—reach for safety and reach for yield—that can destabilize the receiving country.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/705719
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25