Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 X 2 Games: Comment

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2011
Volume: 101
Issue: 2
Pages: 1029-40

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura (2008) recently reported laboratory results for completely mixed 2 X 2 games used to compare Nash equilibrium with four other stationary concepts: quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium. We reanalyze their data, correct some errors, and find that Nash clearly fits worst while the four other concepts perform about equally well. We also report new analysis of other previous experiments that illustrate the importance of the loss aversion hardwired into impulse balance equilibrium: when the other non-Nash concepts are augmented with loss aversion, they outperform impulse balance equilibrium.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:2:p:1029-40
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25