A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 2004
Volume: 119
Issue: 3
Pages: 861-898

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Players in a game are "in equilibrium" if they are rational, and accurately predict other players' strategies. In many experiments, however, players are not in equilibrium. An alternative is "cognitive hierarchy" (CH) theory, where each player assumes that his strategy is the most sophisticated. The CH model has inductively defined strategic categories: step 0 players randomize; and step k thinkers best-respond, assuming that other players are distributed over step 0 through step k - 1. This model fits empirical data, and explains why equilibrium theory predicts behavior well in some games and poorly in others. An average of 1.5 steps fits data from many games.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:119:y:2004:i:3:p:861-898.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25