A Random Attention Model

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2020
Volume: 128
Issue: 7
Pages: 2796 - 2836

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper illustrates how one can deduce preference from observed choices when attention is both limited and random. We introduce a random attention model where we abstain from any particular attention formation and instead consider a large class of nonparametric random attention rules. Our intuitive condition, monotonic attention, captures the idea that each consideration set competes for the decision maker’s attention. We then develop a revealed preference theory and obtain testable implications. We propose econometric methods for identification, estimation, and inference for the revealed preferences. Finally, we provide a general-purpose software implementation of our estimation and inference results and simulation evidence.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/706861
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25