The spillover effect of enforcement actions on bank risk-taking

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance
Year: 2018
Volume: 91
Issue: C
Pages: 146-159

Authors (4)

Caiazza, Stefano (not in RePEc) Cotugno, Matteo (not in RePEc) Fiordelisi, Franco (University of Essex) Stefanelli, Valeria (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Enforcement actions (sanctions) aim to penalize guilty companies and provide examples to other companies that bad behavior will be penalized. A handful of papers analyze the consequences of sanctions in banking for sanctioned companies, while no papers have investigated the spillover effects on non-sanctioned banks. Focusing on credit-related sanctions, we show the existence of a spillover effect: non-sanctioned banks behave similar to sanctioned banks, depending on their degree of similarity, offloading problematic loans and reducing their lending activity.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jbfina:v:91:y:2018:i:c:p:146-159
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25