Coordination and culture

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2017
Volume: 64
Issue: 3
Pages: 449-475

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract Culture constrains individual choice, rendering certain actions impermissible or taboo. While cultural constraints may regulate behavior within a group, they can have a pernicious effect in multicultural societies, inhibiting the emergence of unified social conventions. We analyze interactions between members of two cultural groups who are matched to play a coordination game with an arbitrary number of actions. Due to cultural constraints, miscoordination prevails despite strong incentives to coordinate behavior. In an application to identity-based conflict, exclusive ethnic and religious identities persist in poorer and more unequal societies. Occasional violation of cultural constraints can make miscoordination even more stable.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:64:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-016-0990-3
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25