Ex-post stability of Bayes–Nash equilibria of large games

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2012
Volume: 74
Issue: 1
Pages: 418-430

Authors (2)

Carmona, Guilherme (University of Surrey) Podczeck, Konrad (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We present a result on approximate ex-post stability of Bayes–Nash equilibria in semi-anonymous Bayesian games with a large finite number of players. The result allows playersʼ action and type spaces to be general compact metric spaces, thus extending a result by Kalai (2004).

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:418-430
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25