Money in the Equilibrium of Banking

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
Year: 2022
Volume: 54
Issue: 1
Pages: 119-144

Authors (2)

JIN CAO (Norges Bank) GERHARD ILLING (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Money is both the medium for transaction and the most liquid asset for banks. We examine both roles of money in an integrated framework, where banks are subject to aggregate illiquidity risk. An active central bank can replicate the constrained efficient allocation, which, however, cannot be implemented in the market equilibrium: due to moral hazard problems, banks invest excessively in illiquid assets, forcing the central bank to provide liquidity at low interest rates. An interest rate policy aiming to reduce systemic liquidity risk is dynamically inconsistent. Instead, the constrained efficiency can be achieved by imposing ex ante liquidity coverage requirement.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:jmoncb:v:54:y:2022:i:1:p:119-144
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25