How Trump triumphed: Multi-candidate primaries with buffoons

B-Tier
Journal: European Economic Review
Year: 2023
Volume: 157
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

While people on all sides of the political spectrum were amazed that Donald Trump won the Republican nomination this paper theorizes that Trump’s victory was not a crazy event but rather the equilibrium outcome of a multi-candidate race where one candidate, the buffoon, is viewed as likely to self-destruct and hence unworthy of attack. Our model conceptualizes primaries as a truel (a three-way duel); we solve for its equilibrium, and test its implications in a laboratory experiment. We find that people recognize a buffoon when they see one and aim their attacks elsewhere with the unfortunate consequence that the buffoon has an enhanced probability of winning. This result is strongest amongst those subjects who demonstrate an ability to best respond, suggesting that our results would only be stronger when the game is played by experts and for higher stakes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:eecrev:v:157:y:2023:i:c:s0014292123001356
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25