North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2004
Volume: 121
Issue: 3
Pages: 455-480

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, whilenegotiating with the North about climate change policy andabout the conditions for future Southern engagement. The papermodels the international negotiations with complete and withasymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results showthat, depending on their characteristics, the differentplayers can obtain benefits delaying the moment of theagreement. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:121:y:2004:i:3:p:455-480
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25