Time-inconsistent preferences and social security: Revisited in continuous time

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Year: 2011
Volume: 35
Issue: 5
Pages: 668-675

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Imrohoroglu et al. (2003) prove that it is impossible in a three period partial equilibrium model for social security to improve the welfare of a naive quasi-hyperbolic agent if the program has a negative net present value. This paper first generalizes their impossibility theorem to a continuous time setting and then proves analytically that no discount function exists that can rationalize a social security program with a negative net present value.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:dyncon:v:35:y:2011:i:5:p:668-675
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25