A monetary mechanism for sharing capital: Diamond and Dybvig meet Kiyotaki and Wright

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2004
Volume: 24
Issue: 4
Pages: 769-788

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A model is presented in which banks update public records, accept deposits of fiat money and intermediate capital. I show that inside money is more liquid than outside money, increasing the turnover rates of idle capital. The model offers a simple explanation for the dual role of financial institutions: Banks are monitored and can issue nominal assets upon request, which helps them to transfer capital in sufficiently high rates and to also become intermediaries. The model shares some features with those of Diamond and Dybvig [5], and Kiyotaki and Wright [7]. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:24:y:2004:i:4:p:769-788
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25