Deciding on behalf of others does not mitigate selfishness

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2019
Volume: 183
Issue: C
Pages: -

Authors (2)

Cerrone, Claudia (not in RePEc) Engel, Christoph (Max-Planck-Gesellschaft)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We test whether deciding on behalf of a passive third party makes participants less selfish in a subsequent decision on behalf of themselves. We find that, in a standard dictator game and in a modified dictator game that allows for ”moral wiggle room”, the experience of having decided for others does not mitigate selfishness

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:183:y:2019:i:c:7
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25