Pension design and general public finances: beyond baseline actuarial neutrality

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2025
Volume: 257
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Blanchet, Didier (not in RePEc) Cette, Gilbert (Neoma Business School)

Score contribution per author:

0.505 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The design of pension benefits cannot be considered in disconnection from the constraints related to the general public finances. A change in the average retirement age has an impact not only on pension funding, but also on resources available for other public spending. Incorporating this externality implies penalties/bonuses for earlier/later retirement that are much higher than those designed to balance the pension system alone.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:257:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525005208
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25