Score contribution per author:
α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
The original Buchanan-Tullock formulation of collective decision-making costs may be expanded to: $$C_i =C_i (N_a ,N,H)$$ $$D_i =D_i (N_a ,H)$$ $$G_i =G_i (N,H)$$ Analysis of the effects of group size (N), decision rules (N a ), and homogeneity (H) on external costs (C i ), decision-making costs (D i ), and welfare gains (G i ) can be organized geometrically. Although this analysis extends the Buchanan-Tullock model and suggests a means of geometric manipulation that may be useful in conceptualizing problems of institutional organization much remains to be done. The conditions for optimal group size, degree of heterogeneity, decision rules, and the like require a more extensive effort. Although the general relationships embodied in the external cost and decision-cost functions seem logical and conform to casual observation, their properties — limits, slopes, etc. — have not been developed rigorously or tested empirically; nor have all the insights of other social scientists been brought to bear. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv 1981