A non-perpetual shirking model

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2015
Volume: 134
Issue: C
Pages: 98-101

Authors (2)

Chen, Yu-Fu (not in RePEc) Zoega, Gylfi (Háskóla Íslands)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We provide a finite-horizon counterpart to the Shapiro and Stiglitz model of unemployment to show how workers’ effort falls as they approach the end of an employment spell. The model provides a reason for wages rising more rapidly than productivity.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:134:y:2015:i:c:p:98-101
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25