Public-private partnerships: Task interdependence and contractibility

B-Tier
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Year: 2010
Volume: 28
Issue: 6
Pages: 591-603

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine the proper scope of public-private partnerships in the context of a project consisting of two tasks, building and operation of a facility. We investigate the optimal arrangement regarding bundling versus unbundling and private ownership versus public ownership. Like Bennett and Iossa (2006), we assume that the innovative activity in the building stage has impacts on, among other things, the subsequent operational cost. We relax the nature of task interdependence and study different contractual frameworks. The general insight is that given limitations in contractibility, contrary to common sense, complementarity between tasks favors unbundling over bundling.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:indorg:v:28:y:2010:i:6:p:591-603
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25