Alpha-maxmin as an aggregation of two selves

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2024
Volume: 113
Issue: C

Authors (4)

Chateauneuf, Alain (not in RePEc) Faro, José Heleno (Insper) Tallon, Jean-Marc (Paris School of Economics) Vergopoulos, Vassili (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper offers a novel perspective on the α-maxmin model, taking its components as originating from distinct selves within the decision maker. Drawing from the notion of multiple selves prevalent in inter-temporal decision-making contexts, we present an aggregation approach where each self possesses its own preference relation. Contrary to existing interpretations, these selves are not merely a means to interpret the decision maker’s overall utility function but are considered as primitives. Through consistency requirements, we derive an α-maxmin representation as an outcome of a convex combination of the preferences of two distinct selves. We first explore a setting involving objective information and then move on to a fully subjective derivation.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:113:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824000661
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25