Robust α-maxmin representations

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2024
Volume: 114
Issue: C

Authors (4)

Chateauneuf, Alain (not in RePEc) Qu, Xiangyu (Université Paris-Saclay) Ventura, Caroline (not in RePEc) Vergopoulos, Vassili (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The class of α-maxmin representations of an agent’s preferences is meant to achieve a separation between the ambiguity he perceives and his attitude toward this perceived ambiguity. Yet the same preferences may admit a multiplicity of α-maxmin representations that contradict each other. We say that an α-maxmin representation is robust when no other α-maxmin representation exists for the same preferences. We obtain a full characterization of robustness for maxmin representation. In the case of general α-maxmin representations, we obtain sufficient conditions for both robustness and non-robustness. This contributes to better identification of the α-maxmin representations that admit a robust interpretation in terms of perceived ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:114:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824001058
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25