The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1990
Volume: 105
Issue: 2
Pages: 255-283

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper introduces the fair wage-effort hypothesis and explores its implications. This hypothesis is motivated by equity theory in social psychology and social exchange theory in sociology. According to the fair wage-effort hypothesis, workers proportionately withdraw effort as their actual wage falls short of their fair wage. Such behavior causes unemployment and is also consistent with observed cross-section wage differentials and unemployment patterns.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:105:y:1990:i:2:p:255-283.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24