Vertically Related Markets, Foreign Competition and Optimal Privatization Policy

B-Tier
Journal: Review of International Economics
Year: 2015
Volume: 23
Issue: 2
Pages: 303-319

Authors (2)

Winston W. Chang Han Eol Ryu (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper examines the optimal privatization policy in vertically related markets in which an upstream public firm competes with a foreign private rival in supplying a produced input to the domestic and foreign downstream firms competing in the domestic market. It shows that if the upstream public firm's market share is sufficiently high, full nationalization is optimal and the resulting profit margin is positive. However, complete privatization is never optimal. Numerical simulations reveal both the diverse optimal privatization regimes and the patterns of optimal privatization levels with varying numbers of the domestic and foreign downstream firms.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:reviec:v:23:y:2015:i:2:p:303-319
Journal Field
International
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25