Directional behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects in multiple repeated games

A-Tier
Journal: Experimental Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 22
Issue: 3
Pages: 705-734

Authors (4)

Tracy Xiao Liu (Tsinghua University) Jenna Bednar (not in RePEc) Yan Chen (not in RePEc) Scott Page (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract In this study, we use a novel design to test for directional behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects in a set of multiple repeated games. Specifically, in our experiment, each subject plays a common historical game with two different matches for 100 rounds. After 100 rounds, the subject switches to a new game with one match and continues playing the historical game with the other match. This design allows us to identify the direction of any behavioral spillover. Our results show that participants exhibit both behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects. First, for pairs of Prisoners’ Dilemma and Alternation games, we find that subjects apply strategies from the historical game when playing the new game. Second, we find that those who participate in a Self Interest game as either their historical or new game achieve Pareto efficient outcomes more often in the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Alternation games compared to their control counterparts. Overall, our results show that, when faced with a new game, participants use strategies that reflect both behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:expeco:v:22:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s10683-018-9570-7
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25