The informativeness principle without the first-order approach

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2019
Volume: 113
Issue: C
Pages: 743-755

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Holmström (1979) provides a condition for a signal to have positive value assuming the validity of the first-order approach. This paper extends Holmström's analysis to settings where the first-order approach may not hold. We provide a new condition for a signal to have positive value that takes non-local incentive constraints into account and holds generically. Our condition is the weakest condition possible in the absence of restrictions on the utility function.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:743-755
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25