Search, Adverse Selection, and Market Clearing

B-Tier
Journal: International Economic Review
Year: 2018
Volume: 59
Issue: 3
Pages: 1437-1467

Authors (2)

In‐Koo Cho (Emory University) Akihiko Matsui (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine a dynamic decentralized trading model with infinitesimal sellers and buyers to investigate whether or not the market fails to clear in the limit of search friction vanishing. A seller, who has private information about product quality, and a buyer are matched to bargain over price. They form a long‐term relationship if they reach agreement. They return to the matching pool if they fail to agree or the existing relationship is dissolved. The market fails to clear if and only if the ratio of agents' patience over the dissolution rate exceeds a threshold.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:iecrev:v:59:y:2018:i:3:p:1437-1467
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25