Cost of efficiency in trading perfect complements

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2023
Volume: 230
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

For trade involving perfect complements and fragmented ownership, lower bounds on the deficit cost of supporting efficiency is provided by first providing informative estimates for the generalized VCG mechanism, then doing so for all incentive-feasible direct mechanisms, and finally for all voluntary trading mechanisms.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:230:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523002616
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25