Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2021
Volume: 72
Issue: 2
Pages: 473-509

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract This paper develops a multi-country, multi-sector, and multi-factor model of two-sided matching between heterogeneous workers and entrepreneurs in which agents in different countries can form cross-country teams. Sorting, matching, and sharing problems are all considered in a unified framework. Equilibrium is characterized by endogenous sharing rules, which break away from competitive marginal productivity theories of factor returns. I illustrate that a bilateral economic integration agreement can affect the welfare of agents in an unrelated third country, and that a reduction in the cost of sector-specific matching can increase welfare for all agents without conflicts of interest.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:72:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01297-7
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25