Strategic Voting in Open Primaries.

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2002
Volume: 112
Issue: 1-2
Pages: 1-30

Authors (2)

Chen, Kong-Pin (Academia Sinica) Yang, Sheng-Zhang (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The purpose of an open primary is to incorporate more moderate votes into the primary elections. This intention may backfire when nonparty members strategically participate in the primary, and the result of an open primary might become even more extreme than when nonparty members are not allowed to participate. Realizing this, the party members might also vote strategically to counter-react. If this occurs, then it might actually coordinate the votes of the party's supporters. The effect of strategic voting behavior on the result of a primary depends on the size of the party, turnout rate of nonparty members, the positions of the candidates and the proportion of voters who vote strategically. Strategic voting behavior can sometimes improve social welfare. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:112:y:2002:i:1-2:p:1-30
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25