The Doors of Perception: Theory and Evidence of Frame-Dependent Rationalizability

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2023
Volume: 15
Issue: 2
Pages: 309-44

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We investigate how strategic behavior is affected by the set of notions (frames) used when thinking about the game. In our games the action set consists of visual objects: each player must privately choose one, trying to match the counterpart's choice. We propose a model where different player-types are aware of different attributes of the action set (hence, different frames). One of the novelties is an epistemic structure that allows players to think about new frames, after initial unawareness of some attributes. To test the model, our experimental design brings about multiple frames by varying subjects' awareness of several attributes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:15:y:2023:i:2:p:309-44
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25