Identities, selection, and contributions in a public-goods game

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2014
Volume: 87
Issue: C
Pages: 322-338

Authors (3)

Charness, Gary (not in RePEc) Cobo-Reyes, Ramón (not in RePEc) Jiménez, Natalia (Universidad Pablo de Olavide)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The notions of one's social identity and group membership have recently become topics for economic theory and experiments, and recent research has shown the importance of identity in a wide array of economic environments. But predictions are unclear when there is some trade-off between one's identity (e.g., race, gender, handedness) and potential monetary considerations. We conduct a public-goods experiment in which we permit endogenous group-formation. In a 2×2 design, we vary whether people participate in a team-building exercise and whether some people receive an endowment twice as much as others receive. We find that when both identity and financial considerations are present, high-endowment participants are strongly attracted to each other, with one's word-task-group affiliation eclipsed by the opportunity to earn more. Nevertheless, the team-building exercise greatly increases the level of contribution whether or not one is linked to people from one's team-building exercise.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:322-338
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25