How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?

A-Tier
Journal: Experimental Economics
Year: 2004
Volume: 7
Issue: 2
Pages: 189-205

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr et al. (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the European studies typically feature a high degree of gift exchange, the few U.S. studies provide some conflicting results. We find that the degree of gift exchange is surprisingly sensitive to an apparently innocuous change--whether or not a comprehensive payoff table is provided in the instructions. We also find significant and substantial time trends in responder behavior.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:expeco:v:7:y:2004:i:2:p:189-205
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25