Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2021
Volume: 72
Issue: 1
Pages: 1-19

Authors (3)

Eun Jeong Heo (University of Seoul) Sunghoon Hong (not in RePEc) Youngsub Chun (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract Recent developments in immunosuppressive protocols have enabled patients to receive kidney transplants from biologically incompatible donors. We propose to use immunosuppressants as a part of kidney exchange program. We introduce the “pairwise cycles and chains (PCC)” solution and show that it is Pareto efficient, monotonic, and maximizes the number of compatible transplants and the total number of transplants at the same time among all monotonic matchings.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:72:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01276-y
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25