Egalitarianism in the queueing problem

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 81
Issue: C
Pages: 48-56

Authors (3)

Chun, Youngsub (not in RePEc) Mitra, Manipushpak Mutuswami, Suresh (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We use the Lorenz criterion to select new allocation rules for the queueing problem. We first show that the Lorenz criterion selects a unique rule from four distinct subsets of Pareto efficient allocation rules satisfying some fairness concept. We then compare these four rules whenever possible. When we cannot compare, we use the lexicographic maximin and the lexicographic minimax criteria to make a comparison. However, a Lorenz optimal rule does not exist on the set of Pareto efficient and strategy-proof rules.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:81:y:2019:i:c:p:48-56
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25