A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2019
Volume: 118
Issue: C
Pages: 486-490

Authors (3)

Chun, Youngsub (not in RePEc) Mitra, Manipushpak Mutuswami, Suresh (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We characterize the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem using the axioms of outcome efficiency, budget balance, equal treatment of equals, Pareto indifference, together with a weakening of strategy-proofness, upward-invariance.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:486-490
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25