Incumbents and protectionism: The political economy of foreign entry liberalization

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2008
Volume: 88
Issue: 3
Pages: 633-656

Authors (2)

Chari, Anusha (not in RePEc) Gupta, Nandini (Indiana University)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper investigates the influence of incumbent firms on the decision to allow foreign direct investment into an industry. Using data from India's economic reforms, the results show that firms in concentrated industries are more successful at preventing foreign entry, state-owned firms are more successful at stopping foreign entry than privately-owned firms, and profitable state-owned firms are more successful at stopping foreign entry than unprofitable state-owned firms. The pattern of foreign entry liberalization supports the private interest view of policy implementation and suggests that it may be necessary to reduce the influence of state-owned firms to optimally enact reforms.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:88:y:2008:i:3:p:633-656
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25