The king can do no wrong: On the criminal immunity of leaders

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Public Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 170
Issue: C
Pages: 15-26

Authors (3)

Che, Jiahua (not in RePEc) Chung, Kim-Sau Qiao, Xue (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.345 = (α=2.02 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In its recent anti-corruption campaign, China removed the criminal immunity originally enjoyed by its leaders. Absent fundamental changes in the political institution—in which incumbent leaders, instead of citizens at large, select the next leaders—such a partial reform pays off only if (i) it takes place at the “right” time, (ii) it goes easy on corrupt low-rank officials, and (iii) the government is reasonably centralized. Failing any of these, such a partial reform would lead to rampant corruption throughout the government hierarchy—an outcome far worse than retaining leader immunity.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:pubeco:v:170:y:2019:i:c:p:15-26
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25