Spatial implementation

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2015
Volume: 94
Issue: C
Pages: 200-205

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a spatial model with Euclidean preferences, we introduce a new rule, the geometric median, and characterize it as the smallest rule (with respect to set inclusion) satisfying a collection of axioms. The geometric median is independent of the choice of coordinates and is Nash implementable.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:94:y:2015:i:c:p:200-205
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25