Preference Aggregation With Incomplete Information

S-Tier
Journal: Econometrica
Year: 2014
Volume: 82
Issue: 2
Pages: 589-599

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

4.036 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We show in an environment of incomplete information that monotonicity and the Pareto property applied only when there is common knowledge of Pareto dominance imply (i) there must exist a common prior over the smallest common knowledge event, and (ii) aggregation must be ex ante and ex post utilitarian with respect to that common prior and individual von Neumann–Morgenstern utility indices.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:emetrp:v:82:y:2014:i:2:p:589-599
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25