Eliciting the core of a supermodular capacity

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2005
Volume: 26
Issue: 1
Pages: 203-209

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The paper utilizes duality theory to derive an exact representation of the core of a supermodular capacity for finite-state-space Choquet expected utility preferences. Using the dual representation we develop an algorithm that uses information on willingness to pay and willingness to sell to elicit a supermodular capacity in a finite number of iterations. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:203-209
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25