International trade and the incentive for merger

C-Tier
Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2011
Volume: 43
Issue: 13
Pages: 1673-1677

Authors (2)

Martin Chalkley (University of York) Geoff Stewart (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.505 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This article examines the profitability of horizontal merger in an open economy with Cournot competition. We find that duopoly is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for domestic merger to be profitable. A cross-border merger, however, can be profitable from any market structure.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:taf:applec:v:43:y:2011:i:13:p:1673-1677
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25