Bargaining over perfect complements owned separately: With experimental test

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2010
Volume: 107
Issue: 2
Pages: 115-118

Authors (4)

Yu, Ning (not in RePEc) Chmura, Thorsten (Nottingham Trent University) Pitz, Thomas (not in RePEc) Sun, Ning (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.252 = (α=2.02 / 4 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

This paper considers the situation in which two perfect complements belong to different owners. We calculate the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the mechanism of k + 1 - price bargaining with private value, and did experiment to test the theory.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:2:p:115-118
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25