Net neutrality and investment incentives

A-Tier
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Year: 2010
Volume: 41
Issue: 3
Pages: 446-471

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This article analyzes the effects of net neutrality regulation on investment incentives for Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs), and their implications for social welfare. Concerning the ISPs' investment incentives, we find that capacity expansion decreases the sale price of the priority right under the discriminatory regime. Thus, contrary to ISPs' claims that net neutrality regulations would have a chilling effect on their incentive to invest, we cannot dismiss the possibility of the opposite. A discriminatory regime can also weaken CPs' investment incentives because of CPs' concern that the ISP would expropriate some of the investment benefits.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:randje:v:41:y:2010:i:3:p:446-471
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25