Internet auctions with a temporary buyout option

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2011
Volume: 110
Issue: 3
Pages: 268-271

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We model an Internet auction with a temporary buyout option. Our main result shows that under certain parameter values, there exist two types of equilibria where offering a temporary buyout option with an appropriate reserve price enables the seller to increase expected revenue.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:3:p:268-271
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25