Warranty, Seller Reputation, and Buyer Experience: Evidence From EBAY Used Car Auctions

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Industrial Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 67
Issue: 3-4
Pages: 593-627

Authors (4)

Xiaogang Che (not in RePEc) Hajime Katayama (Waseda University) Peter Lee (not in RePEc) Nan Shi (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Using data from the eBay car auction market, we test several predictions regarding warranties, seller reputation and buyer experience in the determination of the final price. We find that the presence of a warranty generates a price premium, but that its magnitude decreases when the seller has a more established reputation. Compared to private sellers, professional dealers, who are ‘repeated‐game players’ in the market, benefit less from a warranty and its substitutability for seller reputation is relatively small. In addition, a buyer with greater experience tends to pay less for a warranty or for a professional dealership.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jindec:v:67:y:2019:i:3-4:p:593-627
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25