Buyer behavior under the Best Offer mechanism: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from eBay Motors

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2013
Volume: 94
Issue: C
Pages: 11-33

Authors (3)

Huang, Ching-I (National Taiwan University) Chen, Jong-Rong (not in RePEc) Lee, Chiu-Yu (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We use data from eBay Best Offer listings to analyze haggling over prices in transactions with one seller and a series of potential buyers for a limited-supply product. We characterize this transaction mechanism as a sequential-move game to investigate buyer behavior. Our model suggests that a buyer's offer price increases in relations to the number of buyers who have previously made an offer on the item and the Buy-It-Now price chosen by the seller. On the other hand, the offer price decreases for items which have been listed on eBay for a longer period of time. We empirically test our theoretical predictions using data on the sales of Toyota Camry cars on eBay Motors. The empirical evidence is consistent with our model.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:94:y:2013:i:c:p:11-33
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25